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Abstract
Job turnover makes a wage Phillips Curve less forward-looking, with
a smaller coefficient for inflation expectations. Workers discount future
wage income with a low discount factor if there is a strong flow of job
turnover; this implies that future inflation is discounted more heavily with
job turnover. The Phillips Curve flattens both in the short and long run,
due to the correlation between output and inflation expectations. The
paper then derives the optimal monetary policy: in particular, the price
targeting result of the Ramsey policy is violated when there is turnover.
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1 Introduction
The Phillips Curve is central to macroeconomics but its shape has been ques-
tioned recently. The strong short run relationship between inflation and output
(or unemployment) seems to have vanished in the aftermath of the 2008 financial
crisis: unemployment increased and then fell sharply, while inflation remained
low and positive. This would suggest that the short-run Phillips Curve has
become flatter (see Blanchard et al., 2015 ; or Ball and Mazumder, 2019).
The idea of a vertical, or near-vertical long-run Phillips Curve, has also been
questioned. In a recent Peterson policy brief (2016), Blanchard argues that the
long run Phillips curve has become flatter, largely due to inflation expectations
anchored at zero or low levels. The inflation expectation used in the Phillips
Curve is a long-run expectation which is anchored around a reference point,
and only adjusts partially to changes in short-run expectations. As such, the
effect of short-run inflation expectations is largely dampened, and the Phillips
Curve is no longer accelerationist or near accelerationist. This would imply a
real trade-off between output and inflation in the long run.
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Dampened expectations
The Phillips Curve is often assumed to be accelerationist or near accelerationist:
if current inflation increases one-to-one with short-run inflation expectations,
this implies that the output gap is related to the acceleration of inflation.1 But
if the pass-through of short-run inflation expectations to current inflation is
incomplete – or if the relevant inflation expectation is long run expectations
which does not adjust fully to the short-run expectation – then the Phillips
Curve is no longer accelerationist. The rate of inflation – and not only its
acceleration – matters for the output gap. Short-run inflation expectations are
dampened, or play a dampened role, in the sense that they matter less for agents
(and hence current inflation) than what is usually assumed.
This paper shows that a Phillips curve with a dampened role for inflation
expectations is not only flatter in the long run but also in the short run. When
estimating a short run Phillips Curve, ignoring this dampening leads to a re-
duced coefficient on output/unemployment. The reason for this flattening bias is
simple: since current inflation is correlated with output (or unemployment), ex-
pectations of future inflation are correlated with future output (unemployment),
which is itself correlated with current output (unemployment). Mismeasuring
the role of expectations necessarily biases the slope coefficients.
Explanations for these dampened expectations have mostly been behavioral
so far: inflation expectations are either anchored around a reference (Blanchard,
2016), or agents are myopic about the future (Gabaix, 2018). While these effects
are probably important, I show that the dampening can also occur in a micro-
founded model with job turnover; such a micro-foundation is useful to study
the optimal monetary policy. But whatever the source of dampened inflation
expectations in the Phillips Curve, I show that dampening leads to a flatter
long run curve, which is no longer vertical or near vertical. In the short run, the
curve looks flatter if a wrong model without dampening is imposed. The optimal
monetary policy for inflation targeting and stabilisation, is then derived.
Sources of bias
Suppose that we are estimating a simple New Keynesian Phillips Curve with
inflation pit and the output gap yt:
2
pit = κyt + βEt[pit+1] (1)
In this setup β is the risk-less discount factor and κ the output coefficient.
Suppose, however,that the true model features dampened inflation expectations:
pit = κyt + βδEt[pit+1] (2)
δ ∈ (0, 1) is the dampening factor. It can come from anchored expectations, or
a behavioral bias, or as I will show later, job turnover.
1In New Keynesian models of sticky prices, inflation doesn’t exactly increase one-to-one
with expectations, but the pass-through is close to unity, implying a near accelerationist curve.
2but we could also use wage inflation and cyclical unemployment
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Even though it is not the right model, estimating eq (1) will provide an unbi-
ased estimate of κ if the output and inflation expectation coefficient are jointly
estimated (of course the estimated coefficient for expectations will estimate βδ
not β). But eq (1) is often estimated with a calibrated β, which doesn’t account
for any dampening. This leads to a biased estimation of κ if the true model is
eq (2) and the output gap (or cyclical unemployment) is serially correlated.
For example, let us estimate a reduced form Phillips Curve featuring only
the output gap and current inflation pit = κ˜yt, and then backs out the structural
parameters by relying on the auto-regressive properties of the output gap. This
approach has been followed, for example, in Gali (2011).3 Assume that output
is serially correlated:4 yt = ρyyt−1 + ut, with ut a mean-zero disturbance.
Then we can iterate eq (2) forward:
pit = κyt + βδEt [pit+1] = κ
∑
k≥0
(βδ)
k
Etyt+k =
κ
(1− ρyβδ)yt
Estimating this reduced-form equation provides an estimate of κ˜ = κ(1−ρyβδ)
from which κ can be uncovered if β, δ and ρy are known. But if the dampening
factor is not accounted for (ie, having δ = 1), the estimate of κ will be biased.
Property 1 If κ is the true output coefficient, the estimated κ∗ is smaller
κ∗ =
(1− βρy)
(1− ρyβδ)κ < κ
Hence one can see immediately that the dampening factor δ will affect the
slope of a traditional, reduced-form, Phillips Curve displaying only current in-
flation and output, pit = κ˜yt. A non-linear estimation of the Phillips Curve
using the reduced form equation above and the auto-regressive properties of the
output gap (or cyclical unemployment) to back out the slope of the true Phillips
Curve will lead to a biased estimate if the wrong model without δ is estimated.5
The same bias occurs if equation (1) is directly estimated and a wrong re-
striction is imposed for the coefficient β. This is the case in the empirical
estimates of Gali and Gertler (1999), where they use marginal costs instead of
the output gap. They estimate pit = λmct + βEpit+1. The estimated coefficient
of marginal costs, λ, depends on the assumption about the coefficient of future
inflation, β. When this coefficient is restricted to β = 1, the estimated value of
λ is smaller than when there is no restriction and β takes a lower value.6
3Gali (2011) estimates an hybrid wage Phillips Curve featuring unemployment. As un-
employment is assumed to be AR(2), a reduced form Phillips Curve without inflation ex-
pectations is first estimated, before backing out the structural parameters of the true hybrid
Phillips Curve.
4Assuming an AR(1) process allows for simple expressions for the source and amplitude of
the bias. Assuming a more sophisticated process changes the expressions but not the logic.
5The same drawback would obviously apply to any joint estimation of a larger model, if
inflation expectations are dampened but the estimated model doesn’t account for it.
6The same logic would apply if an hybrid Phillips curve as in Gali and Gertler (1999) was
estimated with a restriction on the coefficient of inflation expectations: it would create a bias
in the estimation of other parameters.
3
Job turnover
While anchored or myopic expectations are likely to play a role in the damp-
ening of expectations, I show that the dampening can also occur in a micro-
founded, rational-expectations model with job turnover. Providing a simple
micro-foundation is useful for the study of the optimal monetary policy.
In the New Keynesian wage Phillips curve models, such as the one pioneered
by Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), workers (or unions) set staggered wages
optimally. Current (wage) inflation depends on future (wage) inflation expecta-
tions as well as the output gap. In the log linear approximation, the coefficient
of future inflation is β, the risk-less discount factor. However, when there is a
probability that a worker quits, or that he will be fired and replaced by some-
one else, the net present value of his job will be discounted with a lower factor
than the risk-less discount factor.7 This probability of turnover makes the wage
setting decision, and hence the wage Phillips curve, less forward looking.
A crucial assumption is that when a worker quits (or is dismissed) and is
replaced by an entrant worker, the wage stickiness will be (at least partially)
transmitted to the entrant. The entrant does not renegotiate her wage immedi-
ately, and has to abide by the wage of the previous incumbent she has replaced.8
This model of entry has some Blanchard-Weil perpetual youth flavour. As hinted
by Weil (1989), the crucial feature in these models is as much the probability
of death of the agent, as the stream of newborns, who do not have a say over
decisions made before their birth.9 Here, when a new worker starts a job, he is
bound by the decisions of his predecessor.10 The externality between existing
and new agents creates the additional discounting.
Related literature
Snower and Tesfaselassie (2017) derive a positive optimal long run inflation
target in the presence of job turnover, but they do not investigate the short
run properties much. Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2007) as well as Bilbiie,
Fujiwara and Ghironi (2014) look at the optimal long run monetary policy in a
similar setup: sticky prices with firm entry and exit. In their model, the exit
probability affects the Phillips curve and optimal Ramsey policy. While they
use a Rotemberg instead of a Calvo framework, and inflation offsets different
long run distortions, the intuition, as well as the assumption that new workers
7It is important to distinguish layoffs and dismissals because persons who quit or are
dismissed are replaced and hence count as turnover, while layoffs diminish employment and
are not replaced by new hires.
8Or equivalently, there is no difference between incumbents and entrants in their distribu-
tion of wages. Assuming wage rigidity for new hires is crucial in models such as Hall (2005)
or Gertler and Trigari (2009), who combine wage and labour search frictions. Gertler, Huck-
feldt and Trigari (2016) find no evidence that the wage of new hires is more cyclical than for
existing workers. Galuscak et al. (2012) find similar results for 15 EU countries.
9In the positive sense, the death probability creates the lower discount factor, but in the
normative sense, the externality is caused by the stream of new workers.
10Or if wages are set by a union, it only cares about the welfare of its existing members.
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cannot reset their wage,is largely the same.11 But my paper shows how turnover
affects the slope of the Phillips Curve both in the short and long run, and also
investigates optimal stabilisation policies in the short and long run.
Different explanations have been put forward for the recently flatter Phillips
Curve. Ball and Mazumder (2011) suggest that with menu costs, price changes
will be less frequent when inflation is low, and the resulting Phillips Curve will
be flatter. Changes in the labour market (see Haldane, 2017 or chapter 2 of
the October 2017 World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2017)) or globalization (eg.
Carney, 2017) have been suggested as possible sources of the flatter Phillips
Curve, but without a proper underlying model. Dampened inflation expecta-
tions appear in models of anchored expectations (Blanchard, 2016) or rational
inattention (Gabaix, 2018), but my paper shows how this dampening plays a
crucial role also with the slope of the Phillips Curve itself.
This paper also belongs to the stream of literature that reassesses the New
Keynesian model in light of the Great Recession and the Zero Lower Bound.
While this paper introduces an extra discount factor in the Phillips curve, other
papers have introduced a discount factor in the Euler equation instead, to ex-
plain the forward guidance puzzle. In McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson (2016,
2017) this is due to incomplete financial markets, while in Del Negro, Giannoni
and Patterson (2015), it comes from a Blanchard-Yaari model of perpetual youth
for households which is similar to this paper (where it applies to workers). The
interaction between a discounted Phillips curve and a discounted Euler equation
has been partially studied by Gabaix (2018).
Last, this paper is related to the literature on the optimal level of inflation,
which does not solely rely on the Phillips curve. In their handbook chapter
(2011), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe document such other motives for positive in-
flation. If the price stickiness exhibits a quality bias (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe,
2012), then a positive inflation will simply ensure that the hedonic price level
remains constant. If wages are more rigid downwards than upwards, positive
inflation will make relative wage adjustments easier (Akerlof, Dickens and Perry,
1996; Kim and Ruge-Murcia, 2009). A positive amount of inflation might also
be useful to increase the nominal interest rate safely above zero, in case the zero
lower bound needs to be avoided.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 builds a New Keynesian model
with sticky wages, as well as job turnover. The non linear Phillips curve is
derived and linearly approximated. I examine in section 3 the consequences of
my model for the non linear long-run Phillips Curve, and how turnover affects
the response of output and inflation to supply and demand shocks. Section 4
solves the welfare maximization problem, both in the non linear (steady state
inflation) and quadratic setups (optimal stabilisation). Section 5 concludes.
11In my Calvo framework, workers adopt the wage distribution of existing workers. In a
Rotemberg setup, it is assumed that new workers (or firms) take the existing symmetric wage
(or price), and are not free to choose their starting wage (price) optimally
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2 The model
2.1 A microfounded model
The model of wage rigidities closely follows Gali’s (2008) notations, with monop-
olistic competition in the labour market. There is a continuum of wage-setting
worker types, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1].
Households and firms
Let me first look at the household. A worker of type j maximizes a utility
E0
∑
t≥0
βtU(Ct(j), Nt(j)) (3)
The period utility function U is separable in consumption and labour. The
utility of consumption C, u(C), is a concave function with inverse elasticity of
intertemporal substitution σ, while the disutility of labour N , v(N) is convex
with an inverse Frisch elasticity φ. The utility from consumption and disutility
from labour are scaled by a parameter λ:
U(Ct(j), Nt(j)) = u(Ct(j))− v(Nt(j)) = Ct(j)
1−σ
1− σ − λ
Nt(j)
1+φ
1 + φ
(4)
Perfect competition is assumed in the goods market. The production func-
tion has diminishing returns to labour Nt, with a labour elasticity (1− α):
Yt = N
1−α
t
Labour is a CES aggregate of the labour of each type j, with a wage elasticity
of substitution :
Nt =
[∫ 1
0
Nt(j)
1−1/dj
] 
−1
The aggregate wage index Wt is
Wt =
[∫ 1
0
Wt(j)
1−dj
] 1
1−
The amount of labour of type j employed by firm i is
Nt(j) =
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)−
Nt
Worker j maximizes the expected utility (3) subject to the budget constraint
PtCt(j) +QtBt(j) = Bt−1(j) + (1− τt)Wt(j)Nt(j) +Dt + Tt
where τt is a proportional labour tax (or subsidy) on his labour compensation
Wt(j)Nt(j), Dt is the dividend from owning a diversified portfolio of firms, and
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Tt is a lump sum transfer (or tax) from the government. New bonds Bt(j) can
be bought or sold at price Qt, the stochastic discount factor of the household.
Balanced government budget in each period (Tt = τtWtNt), as well as zero net
supply of bonds, ensures that consumption and output are equal in each period:
PtCt = WtNt +Dt = PtYt
With perfect competition for goods, prices are equal to marginal costs, or
Pt = MCt = Wt
Nαt
1− α
Hence the real wage is linked to output as
Ωt = (1− α)Y −
α
1−α
t
With decreasing returns to scale, firms make a profit Dt = αPtYt.
As in Erceg et al. (2000) or Gali (2008), let us assume markets with complete
contingent claims for consumption but not leisure. This ensures full consump-
tion smoothing across agents.
Lemma 1 With complete markets, there is full consumption smoothing:
∀(t, j), Ct(j) = Ct = Yt
The Euler equation of consumption pins down the risk-less discount factor
Qt = Etβ
Pt
Pt+1
u′(Ct+1)
u′(Ct)
= β
Pt
Pt+1
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
(5)
The labour supply decision for a worker j in problem (3) is equivalent to maxi-
mizing the following quantity in each period
u′(Yt)
(1− τ)Wt(j)Nt(j)
Pt
− λNt(j)
1+φ
1 + φ
(6)
Distortions and dispersions
Let us define the first-best and flexible outcomes. Using the utility and produc-
tion function, the first-best level of output is
Y¯ =
(
1− α
λ
) 1
σ+
φ+α
1−α
Lemma 2 In the flexible outcome, the real wage Ω = WP is a markup µ above
the marginal rate of substitution of the worker:
µ =
(

(− 1) (1− τ)
)
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The flexible-wage output is
Y˜ =
(
1− α
λµ
) 1
σ+
φ+α
1−α = Y¯
(
1
µ
) 1
σ+
φ+α
1−α
The markups depend on the wage elasticity – with a high elasticity, the
markup is close to 1. But it also depends on the wage tax τ . A positive tax
creates an additional wedge, but a subsidy can offset the inefficiency caused by
the finite wage elasticity. Unless the subsidies fully offset the wedges (µ = 1),
the flexible output will be inefficiently low as Y˜ < Y¯ .
With staggered wages, the wage dispersion will be costly in terms of welfare.
When wages are heterogeneous, the aggregate number of hours must increase
to produce the same amount of goods.
Lemma 3 The aggregate utility function can be written
∫ 1
0
U(Ct, Nt(j))dj = Y˜
1−σ

(
Yt
Y˜
)1−σ
1− σ −
1−α
1+φ∆t
(
Yt
Y˜
) 1+φ
1−α
µ
 (7)
with the wage dispersions
∆t =
∫ 1
0
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)−(1+φ)
dj ≥ 1 (8)
2.2 Sticky wages and the Phillips Curve
Worker discounting
A fraction θ of workers have sticky wages, and a fraction δ keeps their job from
one period to another; the two are independent. The discount factor accounts
for the wage and the firms survival probabilities θ and δ. Instead of maximizing
the discounted sum of expression (6) with a discount factor β, the applicable
rate of time preference will be βθδ: the disutility of labour – attached to a
wage and a worker – is discounted by βθδ, while the labour compensation is
discounted by θδQt.
It is assumed that when a worker is replaced, the new worker cannot auto-
matically renegotiate his wage. Instead, he faces the same probability of sticky
wages than existing workers. If they were completely free to choose new wages,
the effect would die out; but as long as the new wage partly takes into account
the wage of existing workers, the effect would be lessened but not die out. This
gives a discrepancy between the joint survival probability θδ of the optimal
wage setting decision, and the true wage stickiness θ that is featured in the
dynamics of the aggregate wage and dispersion. This is the cause of the flatter
8
wage Phillips curve.12 As mentioned before, evidence in Gertler et al. (2016)
or Galuscak et al. (2012) tends to support this assumption.
It is also possible to think about the case where it is the union which sets
the wage of workers of type j, and the union insures workers against layoffs but
not quits or dismissals. When a worker quits, or is dismissed, I assume that
he leaves his labour type and finds a different occupation, where wages are set
by a different union. As such, if the union maximizes the utility of its existing
members, employed or not, it will have a short discounting horizon. And it will
not represent future members, because they do not belong to this union yet.
The non linear Phillips curve
When a worker is free to set a wage wt(j), he seeks to maximize the discounted
sum of the wage compensation minus the disutility, defined in expression (6).
Et
∑
(θβδ)T−t
[
u′(YT )
(1− τT )wt(j)NT (j)
PT
− λNT (j)
1+φ
1 + φ
]
Lemma 4 The re-optimizing wage w∗t is :
(
w∗t
Wt
)1+φ
=
Et
∑
(θβδ)T−tµt
(
Wt
WT
)−(1+φ)
λN1+φT
Et
∑
(θβδ)T−t
(
Wt
WT
)1−
ΩTu′(YT )NT
=
(
Kt
Ft
)
(9)
with recursive terms Ft and Kt
Ft = (1− α)Y 1−σt + θβδEtFt+1Π−1t+1 (10)
Kt = µtλY
1+φ
1−α
t + θβδEtKt+1Πt+1
(1+φ) (11)
This is where the job survival probability, δ plays a role, compared to the
standard model. δ is an extra factor, appearing here in the worker’s discounting,
through the recursive Ft and Kt. In the recursive equation, Ft depends on the
expected future value EtFt+1, multiplied by the inflation and a discount factor
θβδ. The exact same phenomenon occurs for the recursive termKt. The δ makes
these two terms less forward looking than in the standard model, and it makes
the wage Phillips curve flatter, as we will see with the linear approximation.
Each period, only a fraction (1−θ) of wages are re-optimized at the value w∗t ,
while a fraction θ still follows the previous wage distribution, with an aggregate
Wt−1. Using the definition of the aggregate wage, the wage levelWt is a weighted
aggregate of the previous wage level Wt−1 and the current optimal wage w∗t :
13
W 1−t = θW
1−
t−1 + (1− θ)(w∗t )1−
12In their Rotemberg setup, Snower and Tesfaselassie (2017) or Bilbiie et al. (2007; 2014)
assume that new workers (or firms) start with the symmetric wage (price) of existing workers
(firms). It is similar to here: entrants are bound by incumbents
13Importantly, the new hires follow existing wages, so that turnover δ doesn’t play a role in
this law of motion of the aggregate wage
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This provides the dynamics for the wage inflation and dispersion
1− θΠt−1
1− θ = w(Πt) =
(
w∗t
Wt
)1−
=
(
Ft
Kt
) −1
1+φ
(12)
∆t = θ∆t−1Πt(1+φ) + (1− θ)w(Πt)
(1+φ)
−1 (13)
Linear quadratic setup
Although I will look at the optimal steady state level of inflation that the non
linear model yields, it is useful to derive a linear quadratic approximation around
a zero inflation steady state. In the flexible wage steady state, there is no
inflation (Π = 1), and no dispersion (∆ = 1). The steady state values Y˜ , F¯ and
K¯ are easy to pin down. Let us define the percentage deviation of each variable:
pit = log Πt, and dt = log ∆t. Similarly yt, ft and kt denote log deviations of
the capital-letter variables from the steady state.
Property 2 The linear wage Phillips curve is
pit = κyt + βδEt [pit+1] (14)
with κ =
(
φ+α
1−α + σ
)
(1−θ)(1−θβδ)
θ
1
1+φ
This linear wage Phillips curve is similar with the standard wage Phillips
curve in a model of wage stickiness. Current wage inflation positively depends
on the output gap and future expected wage inflation, and negatively on the
real wage. However, two differences stand out. The coefficient κ is slightly
different as it features the parameter δ. But most importantly, future inflation
is discounted by βδ instead of simply β. Intuitively, this is because βδ is now
the discount factor that is applicable to the job tenure of the worker.
3 Implications
3.1 A flatter long run Phillips curve
The long run version of (14) implies a flatter long-run Phillips curves, and it is
no longer vertical or nearly vertical as without turnover:
p¯i =
κ
1− βδ Y˜
When δ is smaller than 1, κ increases slightly. However the increasing effect on
the denominator (1−βδ) largely dominates. This means that long run inflation
will depend less strongly on the long run output gap, and the curve is not as
vertical.
Property 3 In the long run Phillips curve between inflation and output of the
form p¯i = χY˜ , the coefficient χ decreases with turnover (δ falls):
χ =
(
φ+ α
1− α + σ
)
(1− θ)
θ(1 + φ)
1− θβδ
1− βδ
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The non-linear long run Phillips curve
Because the linear equation is only an approximation of a highly non-linear
model, it is useful to see the impact of turnover on the non linear long run
Phillips Curve. Taking the steady state in equations (10), (11) and (12), output
can be written in terms of inflation
Lemma 5 The non linear long-run Phillips curve is(
Y
Y˜
)φ+α
1−α+σ
=
[
1− θβδΠ(1+φ)
1− θβδΠ−1 w(Π)
− 1+φ−1
]
(15)
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Figure 1: Non linear long run Phillips curve for different values of δ
Figure 1 displays the output level Y associated to a long run (annualized,
wage) inflation Π. When Π = 1, Y = 1 (the flex price case). As Π increases,
there is a limited output gain, at least to the first order. With turnover (δ < 1),
the long run trade-off is flatter than in the normal case without. This was true
for the linear approximation of the curves around zero inflation, and it is also
true for the non linear case.
3.2 Demand and supply shocks
I will now examine how this modified Phillips Curve changes the response of
output and inflation to shocks in a simple New Keynesian framework.
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Let me look at a standard Euler equation: in log-linear form,
yt = Etyt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etpit+1)
It can be combined with a Taylor rule
it = φpipit + φyyt
φpi and φy are the inflation and output coefficients. While McKay et al. (2016,
2017) or Del Negro et al. (2015) have a modified Euler equation, I do not look at
this modification here because this equation becomes isomorphic to a standard
Euler equation with modified parameters, once combined with a Taylor rule.14
With my Phillips Curve, the dynamics, incorporating simple shocks, write:
yt =Etyt+1 − 1
σ
(φpipit + φyyt − Etpit+1) + ut
pit =βδEtpit+1 + κyt + vt
The fist equation is often thought as a demand equation, while the second is
a supply equation. ut is a demand shock – coming either from a shock to the
natural rate of interest, or from a monetary policy shock – while vt is a supply
shock – generated either by a productivity or by a cost-push (markup) shock.
The role of persistence
It is only with persistent shocks that turnover will bring significantly different
impulse responses to supply and demand shocks. It is easy to see why. If there
is a transitory (white noise) supply or demand shock today, future expected
variables are not affected, Etpit+1 = Etyt+1 = 0. Whether there is a coefficient
β or βδ in the Phillips Curve is irrelevant, as the expected inflation is zero.
Hence for purely transitory shocks, the model is not affected in any way.
On the other hand, the more persistent the shock, the bigger the difference
between the standard model and this modified model. If the supply or demand
shock is AR(1) with ρ ≈ 1, then Etpit+1 ≈ pit. This means that the Phillips
Curve becomes (1− βδ)pit ≈ +κyt + vt and is flatter with δ < 1 than normally.
Flattening the supply curve does make output more sensitive to demand shocks.
14In their modified Euler equation, yt = γEtyt+1 − 1σ (it − Etpit+1)
with γ ∈ [0, 1] the dampening factor of the Euler equation. While it has strong implications
at the Zero Lower Bound (where the Taylor rule does not apply), it is easy to see that when
γ 6= 1, the modified equation can still be rearranged to appear as a standard Euler equation,
without any dampening: yt = Etyt+1 − 1σγ (φpipit + (φy + (1− γ)σ)yt − Etpit+1)
Hence, when a modified Euler equation (with dampening factor γ < 1) is combined with
a Taylor rule, the behavior is isomorphic to one with a lower elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (γσ instead of σ) and a higher output coefficient in the Taylor rule (φy+(1−γ)σ,
instead of φy). Once this equation is combined with a standard Phillips Curve into the basic
New Keynesian model, the dampening has the same effect as increasing the output coefficient:
The model would show very similar responses to interest rate shocks or cost push shocks.
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Figure 2: y and pi in response to a persistent demand shock
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Figure 3: y and pi in response to a persistent supply shock
Figures 2 and 3 display the impulse response functions of output and inflation
to persistent demand and supply shocks respectively. The model is calibrated
with σ = 1, κ = 0.025, φpi = 1.5 and φy = 0. The shocks are very persistent
(ρ = 0.95), and the turnover/dampening factor is set to 1 and 0.9 respectively.
One can see how turnover and dampened inflation expectations only have a
significant impact on the response of output to persistent demand shocks. As
hinted before, this is because turnover makes the supply curve flatter in the
presence of persistent shocks. A demand shock has a bigger impact on output
when the supply curve is flatter. This implies that for an observed fluctuation
in output, the underlying fluctuation in the natural rate of interest is not as
high as what the standard model would predict. Hence turnover and dampened
inflation expectations significantly matter when the natural rate of interest is
depressed for a while (a persistent negative demand shock) or when monetary
policy persistently undershoots as compared to its baseline Taylor rule.15
15The case of the Zero Lower Bound is different as the Taylor rule no longer applies there.
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4 Optimal Ramsey policy
4.1 Turnover and price (wage) targeting
As we will see, introducing turnover into a standard New Keynesian model has
strong implications for the optimal Ramsey policy. Without turnover, price
(wage) targeting is optimal for the Ramsey policy: even with steady state dis-
tortions, the long run optimal level of inflation is zero; while inflation reacts to
cost push shocks in the short run, this is accompanied by deflation in the future,
so that there is full mean reversion of the price level. In other words, there is
long-run price targeting in response both to long term distortions and short
term cost push shocks. But with turnover, price targeting is no longer optimal:
long run inflation is non zero if there are steady state distortions; in response
to cost push shocks, some deflation in the future offsets the initial response of
inflation, but there is no longer full mean reversion of the price (wage) level.
Welfare function
Let me first define the aggregate welfare function. While workers discount future
wages with the probability of job turnover, individuals do not die. Therefore,
the aggregate utility function of the social planner is simply the aggregation of
each household’s utility given in equation (3). Using equation (7), this is
E0
∑
t≥0
βtU(Ct, Nt(j)) = E0
∑
t≥0
βtY˜ 1−σ

(
Yt
Y˜
)1−σ
1− σ −
1−α
1+φ∆t
(
Yt
Y˜
) 1+φ
1−α
µ
 (16)
In terms of intuition, it is easier to look at the optimality of price targeting in
a quadratic setup. Whens steady state distortions are small, the approximation
of (16) and (13) bring a quadratic approximation that is not different from the
case without turnover. This is because turnover plays no direct role in the utility
function, or the dynamics of the dispersion.
Lemma 6 The second order approximation of the aggregate utility is
U = −
∑
t≥0
βt
[
κ˜
(yt − y¯)2
2
+ (1− α)pi
2
t
2
]
with y¯ = log Y¯
Y˜
and κ˜ =
(
σ + φ+α1−α
)
(1−θ)(1−θβ)
θ
1
1+φ ≈ κ
Contrary to κ, δ does not appear in κ˜, which is exactly the same coefficient
as in the case with no turnover. This is because the distortion is discounted
with the discount factor of the household, where the death shocks play no role.
Let us also assume cost push shocks in the Phillips curve:
pit = κyt + βδEtpit+1 + ut
with ut the cost push shock, an error term. I allow ut to be an AR(1) process
with autocorrelation ρu (ρu = 0 denoting the white noise case).
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Is it optimal to target the price (wage) level?
Denoting λt the Lagrange multiplier of the Phillips Curve at time t, the La-
grangian of the optimal Ramsey policy is
L = −E0
+∞∑
t=0
βt
(
1
2
[
(1− α)pi2t + κ˜ (yt − y¯)2
]
+λt(pit − βδEtpit+1 − κyt − ut)
)
Taking first order conditions and simplifying λt, (1− α)κpi0 = κ˜(y¯ − y0)
and (1 − α)κpit = κ˜ ((y¯ − yt)− δ(y¯ − yt−1)). Used in the Phillips Curve, this
shows that output yt follows a second order difference equation:
(1 +
κ2
κ˜
(1− α)+ βδ2)yt = βδEtyt+1 + δyt−1 + (1− δ)(1− βδ)y¯ − κ
κ˜
(1− α)ut
The steady state of output and inflation are zero only if δ = 1:
y∗ =
(1− δ)(1− βδ)κ˜
(1− δ)(1− βδ)κ˜+ (1− α)κ2 y¯ pi
∗ =
(1− δ)κκ˜
(1− δ)(1− βδ)κ˜+ (1− α)κ2 y¯
When δ = 1, κ˜ = κ, pi0 = (y¯− y0) and pit = − (yt − yt−1), so we can integrate
(wt − w−1) = (y¯ − yt). Thus wt also follows a stationary difference equation
(level targeting). With δ < 1, the wage level can no longer be integrated as a
stationary variable. There is only partial mean reversion of the wage level.
Property 4 Long run level targeting is the optimal Ramsey policy only when
δ = 1. When δ < 1, targeting the nominal wage level is no longer optimal. Long
run inflation is non zero if there are steady state distortions. And in response
to cost push shocks, some deflation in the future offsets the initial response of
inflation, but there is no longer full mean reversion of the wage level (see fig 4).
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Figure 4: Ramsey policy in response to a wage cost-push shocks
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The intuition is as follows: in the benchmark, by committing to give up some
discretion in the future, the planner has some extra discretion in the present to
offset cost push shocks, or an inefficient steady state. So that price (or wage)
stability is optimal from today’s perspective, but there is an incentive to renege
tomorrow. With turnover, workers are less responsive to commitments, so that
the current gain in terms of commitment no longer offsets the inefficiency in the
future. Thus, even with a credible commitment, inflation will always be used
to offset cost push shocks or steady state inefficiencies.
4.2 Long run optimal inflation
In this subsection, I derive the optimal steady state inflation implied by the
non-linear model. While a closed form expression was available for the long run
Phillips curve, the optimal level of steady-state inflation (for a given amount of
steady state distortions) can only be defined implicitly. As such, it is useful to
calibrate most of the parameters, to provide a graphical illustration. As in Gali,
let us calibrate α = 0.25, β = 0.99,  = 5, θ = 0.75, φ = 5 and σ = 1. Now I
need to find values for δ. Let us consider a low turnover scenario (δ = 0.95, or
an average duration of 5 years) and an intermediate scenario with δ = 0.90.
For the timeless Ramsey policy, I write the full dynamic Lagrangian (with
Yt, Kt and Ft re-normalized to flex wage values). The social planner maximizes
the discounted sum of the per period utilities (7), subject, in each period, to the
recursive expressions of Ft and Kt (equations 10 and 11), the ratio
Kt
Ft
(equation
12), as well as the dynamics of ∆t (equations 13). The Lagrangian writes
L =
∑
βt

[
1
1−σY
1−σ
t − 1µt 1−α1+φY
1+φ
1−α
t ∆t
]
+φ1,t
[
Ktw(Πt)
1+φ
−1 − Ft
]
+φ2,t
[
Ft − Y 1−σt − θβδEtFt+1Π−1t+1
]
+φ3,t
[
Kt − Y
1+φ
1−α
t − θβδEtKt+1Πt+1(1+φ)
]
+φ4,t
[
∆t − θ∆t−1Πt(1+φ) − (1− θ)w(Πt)
(1+φ)
−1
]

After taking the first order conditions, I look at the steady state value of each
constraint and multiplier. As opposed to Benigno and Woodford (2005), because
of turnover, the timeless optimal inflation is no longer zero. Figure 5 displays
the optimal rate of inflation depending on the amount of steady state distortions
(implied by Y¯ > 1), for different values of δ. When δ = 1, I have the classic result
of zero inflation in the long run, but it increases as this parameter decreases.
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Figure 5: Steady state inflation without and with turnover
When δ = 1, there is no inflation for the timeless Ramsey policy: this is
the optimality of price stability. However, when turnover is introduced, the
optimal level of inflation increases with the output gap, for both the constant
and timeless cases. It is is in the order of 1− 2% annually with a high turnover
and output gap (Y¯ >> 1), and would be higher if there was partial indexation.
5 Conclusion
This paper constructed a New Keynesian model with Calvo wage stickiness, as
well as job turnover. I show how this leads to a Phillips Curve that is far less
forward looking. When looking at a medium run Phillips Curve, with persistent
output or unemployment disturbances, this can account for a flatter curve. If
the coefficient of future inflation is restricted in a standard NK Phillips Curve,
this creates a bias on the estimate of the slope of the Phillips Curve, and this
bias increases with more turnover. In the long run, the Phillips Curve is also
flatter, and no longer vertical or near-vertical.
I show how turnover breaks the optimality of price stability. Optimal Ram-
sey policy no longer targets the price level in response to cost push shocks. If
turnover is large, and if the steady state distortions are high enough, the optimal
level of inflation can reach 1 − 2% annually. In fact, if there was partial price
and wage indexation, the optimal inflation would be higher, or a same amount
of inflation would be rationalized by a lower turnover or steady state distortion.
One fruitful avenue of future research would be to investigate the empirics.
A cross section of different sectors, and different types of workers - eg, temporary
vs. permanent employees - could provide strong empirical evidence. It would
also be interesting to endogenise the turnover, as it does depend on institutions.
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Appendix
Linear quadratic approximation
Linear wage PC The log linear approximation of (10) and (11) yields,
ft = (1− θβδ) [−σyt] + θβδEt [ft+1 + (− 1)pit+1]
kt = (1− θβδ)
[
φ+α
1−α yt
]
+ θβδEt [kt+1 + (1 + φ)pit+1]
While for equation (12) it is pit = − 1−θθ 11+φ (ft − kt), which brings
pit =
(1− θ) (1− θβδ)
θ
1
1 + φ
(
φ+ α
1− α + σ
)
yt + βδEt [pit+1]
Dispersion Combining eqs (12) and (13), their 2nd order approximation is
dt = θdt−1 +
θ
1− θ (1 + φ)(1 + φ)
pi2t
2
Thus the discounted sum of the dispersions bring∑
t≥0
βtdt =
θ(1 + φ)(1 + φ)
(1− θ)(1− θβ)
∑
t≥0
(pit)
2
2
=
(1 + φ)
λ˜
∑
t≥0
pi2t
2
with λ˜ = (1−θ)(1−θβ)θ
1
1+φ 6= λ.
Welfare The 2nd order approximation of the utility function (7) is
yt − σ y
2
t
2 − 1µ
(
yt +
φ+α
1−α
y2t
2
)
− 1µ 1−α1+φ (dt)
=
(
1− 1µ
)
yt −
(
σ + 1µ
φ+α
1−α
)
y2t
2 − 1µ 1−α1+φ (dt)
Denoting y¯ the log of the natural output,
(
1− 1µ
)
≈ log [µ] =
(
σ + φ+α1−α
)
y¯
Up to a constant, the time-discounted objective function of the social planner
can be written with output and the dispersions
U = −
∑
t≥0
βt
[(
σ +
φ+ α
1− α
)
(yt − y¯)2
2
+
1− α
1 + φ
dt
]
Replacing the discounted sum of dispersion with inflation, we get
U = −
∑
t≥0
βt
[(
σ +
φ+ α
1− α
)
(yt − y¯)2
2
+
(1− α)
λ˜
(pit)
2
2
]
Long run Ramsey Policy
This closely ressembles Benigno and Woodford (2005), with added turnover
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Lagrangian (with Yt, Kt, Ft renormalized to flex price values)
L =
∑
βt

[
1
1−σY
1−σ
t − 1µt 1−α1+φY
1+φ
1−α
t ∆t
]
+φ1,t
[
Ktw(Πt)
1+φ
−1 − Ft
]
+φ2,t
[
Ft − Y 1−σt − θβδEtFt+1Π−1t+1
]
+φ3,t
[
Kt − Y
1+φ
1−α
t − θβδEtKt+1Πt+1(1+φ)
]
+φ4,t
[
∆t − θ∆t−1Πt(1+φ) − (1− θ)w(Πt)
(1+φ)
−1
]

First order conditions
Yt :
[
Y −σt −
1
µ
∆tY
φ+α
1−α
t
]
= φ2,t
[
(1− σ)Y −σt
]
+ φ3,t
[(
1 + φ
1− α
)
Y
φ+α
1−α
]
∆t : − 1µ 1−α1+φY
1+φ
1−α
t + φ4,t − φ4,t+1βθΠ(1+φ)t+1 = 0
Kt : φ1,tw(Πt)
1+φ
−1 + φ3,t − φ3,t−1θδΠ(1+φ)t = 0
Ft : −φ1,t + φ2,t − φ2,t−1θδ (Πt)−1 = 0
Πt : φ1,t
[
Kt
1+φ
−1 w
′(Πt)w(Πt)
1+φ
−1 −1
]
= φ2,t−1
[
θδFt(− 1)Π−2t+1
]
+ φ3,t−1
[
θδKt(1 + φ)Π
(1+φ)−1
t
]
+φ4,t
[
θ∆t−1(1 + φ)Π
(1+φ)−1
t + (1− θ) (1+φ)−1 w′(Πt)w(Πt)
(1+φ)
−1 −1
]
Steady state of constraints Kw(Π)
1+φ
−1 = F(
1− θβδΠ−1)F = Y 1−σ (1− θβδΠ(1+φ))K = Y 1+φ1−α(
1− θΠ(1+φ)
)
∆ = (1− θ)w(Π) (1+φ)−1 w(Π) = 1− θΠ
−1
1− θ
Steady state of FOCs
Y :
[
Y −σ − 1µ∆Y
φ+α
1−α
]
= φ2 [(1− σ)Y −σ] + φ3
[(
1+φ
1−α
)
Y
φ+α
1−α
]
∆ : 1µ
1−α
1+φY
1+φ
1−α = φ4
(
1− βθΠ(1+φ)t+1
)
K : −φ1w(Π)
1+φ
−1 = φ3
(
1− θδΠ(1+φ))
F : φ1 = φ2
(
1− θδΠ−1)
Π : φ1
[
K 1+φ−1 w
′(Π)w(Π)
1+φ
−1 −1
]
= φ2
[
θδF (− 1) (Πt+1)−2
]
+ φ3
[
θδK(1 + φ)(Π)(1+φ)−1
]
+φ4
[
θ∆(1 + φ)Π(1+φ)−1 + (1− θ) (1+φ)−1 w′(Π)w(Π)
(1+φ)
−1 −1
]
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Solving the optimal rate of inflation
The previous FOC can be rewritten as
φ1F
[
(1 + φ)
(
δΠ(1+φ)
1−θδΠ(1+φ) − Π
−1
1−θΠ−1
)
+ (− 1)
(
Π−1
1−θΠ−1 − δΠ
−1
(1−θδΠ−1)
)]
= φ4∆(1 + φ)
[
Π(1+φ) −Π−1 1−θΠ(1+φ)1−θΠ−1
]
Now express every variable as a function of Π to later solve Π as a function of µ
w(Π) =
1− θΠ−1
1− θ
Y
φ+α
1−α+σ =
[
1− θβδΠ(1+φ)
1− θβδΠ−1 w(Π)
− 1+φ−1
]
F =
Y 1−σ
1− θβδΠ−1
∆ =
(1− θ)w(Π) (1+φ)−1
1− θΠ(1+φ)
φ4 =
1
µ
1− α
1 + φ
Y
1+φ
1−α
1− βθΠ(1+φ)
φ1 =
φ4∆(1 + φ)
[
Π(1+φ) −Π−1 1−θΠ(1+φ)1−θΠ−1
]
F(1 + φ)
[
δΠ(1+φ)
1−θδΠ(1+φ) − Π
−1
1−θΠ−1
]
+ F (− 1)
[
Π−1
1−θΠ−1 − δΠ
−1
(1−θδΠ−1)
]
Having everything expressed in terms of Π, I can solve Π as a function of µ
[
Y −σ − 1
µ
∆Y
φ+α
1−α
]
= φ1
(1− σ)Y −σ
1− θδΠ−1 − φ1
(
1+φ
1−α
)
Y
φ+α
1−α
1− θδΠ(1+φ)w(Π)
1+φ
−1
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